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Are Legal Restrictions On 
Disparaging Personal 
Names Unconstitutional?-
In re The Slants (Guest 
Blog Post) 
December 23, 2015 · by Eric Goldman· in Trademark 
By Guest Blogger Laura Heymann 
[Eric's introduction: Prof. Heymann has spent more 
time thinking about the Law of Naming People and 
Things than anyone else I know. I asked her to 
weigh in on the potential implications of the Federal 
Circuit's Tam decision (The Slants decision) for 
restrictions on personal names. Her thoughts:] 
The Federal 
Circuit's 
decision inln 
reSimon 
Shicro Tam will, no doubt, be the subject of much 
commentary in the weeks to come. As readers have 
no doubt already learned, the majority held that the 
portion ohs U.S.C. § 2(a)-thatprohibits the 
registration of a trademark if it "may disparage ... 
persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or 
national symbols, or bring them into contempt or 
disrepute" -is facially unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment 
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Tam had sought to register THE SLANTS as the 
trademark for his Asian American rock band in an 
attempt to "reclaim" the word, and it was this 
expressive function of trademarks that led the 
majority (and for Judge Dyk, as applied to Tam's 
case) to hold that regulation on the basis of the 
mark's meaning could not be justified. 
I'll leave it to others to explore the implications of 
the court's holding for other areas of trademark law, 
including the additional section 2(a) prohibitions 
that are not based on deception or confusion, as well 
as trademark defenses such as descriptive fair use. 
For now, I want to highlight the ways in which the 
Federal Circuit's holding can have equal application 
to courts' consideration of personal name change 
petitions. 
(Personal names are not the only area potentially 
implicated by the Federal Circuit's reasoning: 
Consider, for example, 46 C.F.R § 67.117, part of 
the Vessel Documentation Act of 1980, which 
prohibits names that "contain [or are] phonetically 
identical to obscene, indecent, or profane language, 
or to racial or ethnic epithets.") 
As I've discussed previously on this blog and 
elsewhere (Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law), 
personal names have at least three functions. A 
name's denotative function allows us to refer. A 
name's connotative function is what makes naming 
a creative act - it allows the namer to suggest 
gender, class, religious or historical connections, or 
other characteristics. Naming is in this way also a 
demonstration ofpower, as in when a nickname or 
disparaging group name is given to another. And a 
name also has an associative function in that it 
signals a connection to a group or family. 
As with trademarks, no official recognition is 
required to establish a name- use and adoption by 
others is what validates a name. And so when courts 
are petitioned for official recognition, many will 
claim- as the PTO has typically done with 
trademarks -that the process is largely ministerial, 
and that the only role that the court should play is to 
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ensure that the name change won't cause fraud or 
deception. 
In the past, however, some courts have grappled 
with their unease at being asked to register a name 
that is offensive or otherwise objectionable and have 
used the discretion granted to them by statute to 
deny such petitions. A California court affirmed in 
1992 a lower court's denial of a petitioner's request 
to change his name to a racial epithet because, in 
part, it concluded that granting the request would be 
seen as "promoting racial disharmony." Similarly, a 
New Mexico court in 2008 affirmed a lower court's 
denial of request to change the petitioner's name to 
"[F***J Censorship!" 
As the Federal Circuit has now confirmed, however, 
these decisions should be seen as unconstitutional. 
As with trademark registration, a court's approval of 
a name change petition isn't itself government 
speech or otherwise an imprimatur; accordingly, to 
approve some requests and deny others based on the 
meaning of the proposed name constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination. 
It's true that reported decisions denying name 
change petitions appear to be waning. Judges have 
become more accustomed to the fluidity of identity 
over time and to the desire to have one's name reflect 
that identity. But some petitioners may never get to 
the courtroom, discouraged by court websites that 
continue to tell applicants that they cannot petition 
for a name that is "bizarre, unduly lengthy, 
ridiculous, or offensive," as both theN ew York state 
court system's website and the Utah state court 
system's website do. (This is simply a different 
version ofwhatElizabeth Emens described as "desk-
clerk law.") The Federal Circuit's opinion may 
inspire those courts to take a fresh look at how the 
information they provide shapes the public's 
understanding of the FirstAmendment 
Eric's Comments: 
*The Federal Circuit is often castigated as an IP 
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maximalist court, so it's tempting to dismiss this 
ruling as just the Federal Circuit once again 
expanding trademark's boundaries to greenlight 
more trademark registrations. Perhaps an IP 
maximalist impulse steered the majority in that 
direction, but I see this ruling as actually a really 
savvy pro-free speech ruling. Can the government 
deny government benefits to prevent 
"disparagement''? No, that clearly would be a 
government effort to suppress socially disfavored 
speech, and the Federal Circuit fully recognized the 
law's censorious implications. I'm especially 
impressed that the court wasn't phased by the 
venerability of this decades-old statute. 
* Historically, the Patent Office denied patents on 
the grounds that the inventions were immoral (a 
paradigmatic example was gambling machines). 
That moralistic streak died out decades ago, for good 
reason. Preserving morality isn't a proper 
government function, and the government never will 
do a good job implementing such amorphous 
standards. I see this ruling as wiping out the 
analogous principles in trademark law. (The court 
makes it clear that it isn't opining on the statutory 
restrictions against registering scandalous or 
immoral marks, though I think the court's logic 
should apply equally to those statutory terms). 
* I'm sure judges aren't looking forward to the 
coming legal battles over trademarks using 
indelicate terms. It's hard to maintain judicial 
decorum when socially disfavored phrases shows up 
dozens of times in each partYs brief. 
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